Roy Blunt: Treasury China biotech curbs could weaken U.S. lead

By Tom Whitfield

$3.7 billion. The United States ran a pharmaceutical trade surplus over China in 2025, a position former Sen. Roy Blunt says could weaken if Treasury broadly restricts U.S. biotech investment in China.

What would the Treasury proposal change?

In late October, Treasury proposed expanding the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security (COINS) Act, which limits U.S. investments in strategically sensitive Chinese industries, to biotech as a whole. The proposal would broadly prevent U.S. companies from investing in, acquiring or partnering with Chinese biotech firms.

Blunt calls the proposal well-intentioned but counterproductive. Its stated aim is national security: stop American resources from building China’s already expanding biotech capabilities. His objection is scope. As written, the measure could do more damage to U.S. companies than to Chinese ones because restrictions could slow the development of breakthrough medicines.

The former senator, who served 12 years in the U.S. Senate, ties American leadership to public health, economic growth and national security. He says U.S. leadership lets the country respond quickly to public-health emergencies without relying on foreign adversaries.

As chairman of the subcommittee overseeing NIH, Blunt says he worked with colleagues in both parties to secure a nearly 50% increase in agency funding. He credits that investment for research progress and says President Trump’s Operation Warp Speed built on NIH initiatives during the Covid-19 pandemic, helping end the pandemic and save lives.

Blunt said: “Those broad restrictions are more likely to weaken the United States than China.”

Takeaway: The security rationale does not settle whether the proposal’s breadth would slow U.S. drug development.

Why do U.S. drugmakers rely on Chinese biotech?

American drugmakers use acquisitions, joint ventures and other partnerships to move discoveries made abroad into their own research and development pipelines. Chinese firms are taking a growing share of the world’s innovative drug candidates, which makes those links more strategically important, according to Blunt.

He says the arrangements give American patients more opportunities to join clinical trials and gain access to potentially lifesaving treatments. They also give U.S. companies influence over where and how medicines develop and get manufactured, which supports more reliable supply.

Blunt goes further: the partnerships do not make America dependent on China. They keep U.S. firms at the top of global drug development and make China reliant on American medicines, a claim the $3.7 billion trade surplus is meant to support.

The argument deserves a caveat. A trade surplus shows the current direction of pharmaceutical trade, but it does not prove China would lack alternative partners. Blunt provides no company exposure data, estimate of affected deals or forecast for trial delays.

Takeaway: Partnerships offer speed, trial access and supply influence, though the commentary does not quantify the proposed rule’s cost.

Where would Chinese discoveries go?

Blunt expects Chinese biotech firms to respond to an effective U.S. ban by seeking partners among American companies’ global rivals. They could also expand their own research, manufacturing and commercialization operations to replace American partners. In his view, neither route helps Washington retain influence over the next generation of innovative medicines.

The result could be longer waits for promising treatments and fewer clinical trial opportunities for American patients. Over time, the United States could rely more heavily on foreign companies for access to innovative drugs, creating what Blunt calls a potential national security vulnerability.

That outcome is a risk, not a forecast. The commentary gives no implementation timetable, enforcement model or estimate of how quickly Chinese companies could replace U.S. capital, expertise or trial networks. It therefore cannot establish whether restrictions would produce faster losses abroad or slower gains at home.

Takeaway: A broad ban could redirect partnerships, but the speed and scale of that shift remain unquantified.

Can Treasury narrow the rule?

Blunt said: “Treasury officials would be wise to narrow their proposal to focus on biotech deals that pose clear security threats.” His examples include agreements involving technologies that could produce biological weapons. He urges Treasury to allow ordinary research partnerships and define prohibited arrangements.

The proposal is designed to permit standard licensing agreements, but Blunt says its broad language could treat common licensing terms as prohibited joint ventures. That uncertainty matters. If companies cannot determine which structures fall within the ban, they may walk away from useful partnerships.

He pairs a narrower foreign-investment screen with more investment at home. The policy priorities he lists are:

• sustaining federal funding for scientific research;
• strengthening the U.S. intellectual property system;
• safeguarding research institutions from foreign interference; and
• expanding domestic research and manufacturing capacity.

The warning to the Trump administration is blunt but conditional. America should remain wary of China’s ambitions, yet cannot preserve its biotech lead by cutting itself off from promising advances made overseas, Blunt argues.

A targeted screen could address genuine security risks without sacrificing the partnerships that keep American drug development moving.